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Southern Europe and the ‘Trade Off’: Architects of European Disunion? 
Martin J. Bull 
 
Introduction 
The global economic and downturn and ensuing Eurozone crisis has focused attention on the 
traditional ‘periphery’ of the European Union (the ‘old’ southern Europe of Portugal, Italy, 
Greece and Spain) and revived an age-old fear that Europe, in the words of the Financial 
Times, ‘is economically and politically divided between a northern hard core and a flaky 
southern fringe’ (quoted in Verney, 2009: 1). Excepting Ireland (which might be described as 
a ‘periphery’ of the North), the Eurozone crisis stood out both for the public indebtedness of 
the four ‘old’ south European states and the collapse in confidence of the markets in their 
capacities to repay those debts.1 With the Greek government close to default on its debts in 
the Summer of 2010, the Eurozone, in a first ever bail out of a debt-laden country, negotiated 
a Euro 110 billion rescue package. This was followed, in late 2010, by Ireland, and, in April 
2011, Portugal. This coincided with a re-emergence of the Greek crisis when it was evident 
that the bail-out was failing, requiring a further Euro 109 billion rescue package on new 
(easier) terms and conditions described by Jean-Claude Trichet (then head of the European 
Central Bank), as a form of expected ‘selective default’ of temporary duration; a package, 
however, that took months to negotiate and was not accepted until November. During this 
process, the fear of contagion became real as the economies of Spain and Italy came under 
severe pressure in the Autumn of 2011, with Italy in the subsequent months entering a 
dramatic crisis of borrowing which took the crisis to an entirely different level (since the size 
of the Italian economy and its public debt makes it effectively not subject to rescue). 
This situation, not unanticipated in some general approaches to European integration 
(e.g. Dyson and Marcussen 2010), prompted a political crisis at two levels. The first was in 
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economic governance in the EU, resulting from an inability to provide decisive leadership 
and management of the Greek and southern European situations and therefore the Eurozone 
overall.  The second level was the domestic. March 2011 saw the resignation of Portugal’s 
Prime Minister, José Sócrates. Shortly after, the Spanish Prime Minister, José Zapatero, 
announced that he would stand down and elections in November saw the Socialists 
effectively wiped out on the back of a massive centre-right majority on a programme of 
austerity. In October the Greek Prime Minister, George Papandreou, having caused a 
veritable political storm by unexpectedly announcing that the second rescue package he had 
agreed with the Eurozone leaders would be subject to a referendum before it could become 
formally accepted (a position that was subsequently rapidly abandoned), was forced to resign 
and was replaced by an economist, Lucas Papademos. In November, the crisis of market 
confidence enveloping Italy took with it the Berlusconi government, Berlusconi resigning and 
being replaced by a technical government headed by an economist and former EU 
Commissioner, Mario Monti.  
This chapter will view the southern European enlargement in the 1980s and the EU-
southern European relationship as based on a form of ‘trade-off’ between ‘solidarity’ on the 
one hand and ‘sovereignty’ or ‘discipline’ on the other. It will suggest that, while the trade-
off appeared to work well until the launch of the single currency in a period which might be 
described as a ‘golden age’ in the EU-Mediterranean relationship (e.g. Tsoulakis 2006), in the 
2000s it began to deteriorate through a combination of different factors (launch of the Euro, 
enlargement, reform of cohesion policy, prospective reform of the common agricultural 
policy, economic crisis) of which the Eurozone crisis became the most critical reflection. 
This has produced a third level of crisis (between the EU and the southern European states 
themselves) that could produce new forms of solidarity and discipline embodying much 
tighter restrictions on economic sovereignty than in the past. 
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‘Solidarity’ and Southern Europe: Rise and Fall 
It could be argued that the southern European democracies, in contrast with their northern 
counterparts, have been characterised by using European integration in three complementary 
ways: first, to support and reinforce their (at one time) fragile democracies; second, to obtain 
‘solidarity’ through funds to support their economic development; and, third, to help resolve 
problems and impose fiscal and economic discipline where the political classes proved unable 
or unwilling (the EU as a welcome ‘external constraint’). In short, the membership of the EU 
involved a ‘trade off’ which went to the heart of the raison d’être of the integration process: 
democratic consolidation and solidarity (in the form of cohesion) in return for better 
economic and fiscal discipline, which itself would be assisted through European economic 
rules. For existing members, entry of the southern European states would be a mixed 
blessing. One the one hand, it would provide greater security on its southern border, while, on 
the other, it introduced peripheral economies which might constrain European Community 
ambitions into being no more than a free trade area; hence, the importance of cohesion and 
convergence policies to the European framework. 
 It is therefore no surprise to find that the introduction, development and extension of 
cohesion policies mirrored the enlargement of the EU (although even in the period before the 
launch of a regional policy in 1973, Italy benefited from a form of spatial policy through the 
European Social Fund). The introduction of regional policy and the creation of the European 
Regional Development Fund (ERDF) that followed two years later was a product of the deal 
negotiated over accession of the UK and Ireland. The Mediterranean enlargement of the 
1980s (Greece – 1981, Spain and Portugal – 1986) led to the adoption of the Integrated 
Mediterranean Programmes, larger funding and the creation of a Cohesion Fund. This fund 
began to operate in 1993, the budget rising to about 3 per cent of the overall EU budget by 
1999, with the 1995 Scandinavian enlargement leading to the adoption of further objectives 
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particularly relevant to these countries (regions with sparse populations). In the course of the 
new Millennium the Fund was expanded and reformed again (in relation to budgetary 
redistribution and policy substance) with the entry of new members from the former 
communist states in 2004 ands 2007. By 2010 cohesion policy was the largest item in the EU 
budget, surpassing even the Common Agricultural Policy (Begg, 2010: 77). 
As Begg (2010: 78) argues, cohesion (and specifically territorial cohesion), while 
‘tending to be equated operationally with regional divergence in economic indicators, such as 
GDP per head, and (in a less easily calibrated way) social conditions …. is ultimately a 
political notion.’ Its political nature was seen not just in its nature as a goal (that the nation-
states should ‘converge’) and in the negotiations at different phases that led to its 
implementation, but also in convergence being a fundamental part of the longer-term goal of 
economic and monetary union. This was in the form of a quid pro quo which was made 
explicit as early as 1973 in a European Communities Report on the Regional problems in the 
Enlarged Community where it was stated that: ‘No Member States can be expected to support 
the economic and monetary disciplines of Economic and Monetary Union without 
Community solidarity involved in the effective use of such instruments; equally Member 
States must be prepared to accept the disciplines of Economic and Monetary Union as a 
condition of this Community support’ (quoted in Manzella and Mendez 2009: 9). For this 
reason, despite the fact that cohesion policy, over the years, developed multiple goals that 
were not easily reconcilable (equity, solidarity, sustainable development, competitiveness, 
good governance) the redistributive bias towards less prosperous states was consistent, and 
led critics to argue that the policy, in fact, amounted to little more than a form of ‘side 
payment’ to certain countries to ‘buy’ their support for other objectives: ‘In this…view, the 
Cohesion Fund could be seen as the price extracted by the (then) four cohesion countries – 
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Greece, Ireland, Portugal, Spain – for acquiescing in the establishment of economic and 
monetary union’ (Begg 2010: 82).  
If this was a ‘trade off’ there can be little doubt that, at least in the initial period, the 
southern European states reaped its benefits. Their fledgling democracies were consolidated 
under the EU umbrella, and their economies underwent a process of opening out and change, 
supported by significant financial assistance from agricultural, regional development, training 
and cohesion programmes. Empirical analyses up to 2000-01 concluded that convergence of 
the Mediterranean countries with the European average had occurred (notably after 1986) and 
that structural funds had had a clear impact on this process (Beugelsdijk and Eijffinger 2005; 
Barry 2003).  
In the Millennium, however, the issue of solidarity with southern Europe was 
gradually (if not inevitably) called into question, largely as a result of the enlargement to 
central and Eastern Europe that occurred. In 2004 eight central and east European former 
communist countries (Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia 
and Slovenia) and two more Mediterranean countries (Malta and Cyprus) entered the EU, and 
2007 saw the addition of Bulgaria and Hungary. The accession of these twelve countries 
transformed the nature of the EU and specifically its periphery, widening regional disparities 
considerably. In 2005, the fourteen regions with the lowest GDP per head were from three 
countries: Bulgaria, Poland and Romania. Moreover, countries such as Poland entered with 
large agriculture sectors. The Cohesion Fund was reformed (in line with the Lisbon Agenda’s 
aims) for the period 2007-13 and, while southern European states  were still allocated 
substantial allocations of structural funds, the likelihood of this into the post-2013 period is 
unclear. Depending on how the funds are allocated, countries such as Italy and Spain may 
find themselves in the positions of being net contributors. More generally, European regional 
policy faces dilemmas in relation to member-state expectations which may not bode well for 
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southern Europe, as the debate on the future of structural funds suggests. For the least 
prosperous Member States, convergence is about raising GDP per head nationally, and the 
most effective method is to invest in growth poles with the greatest returns (e.g. in capital 
regions such as Warsaw or Bratislava); for more prosperous Member States, the concern is 
more with territorial imbalance both across Europe and specifically within their own states. 
Consequently, ‘an especially contentious issue is how to interpret the Treaty commitment to 
cohesion for richer states; or to put the question starkly: should the EU try to deal with 
regional problems in eastern Germany, northern England or the Mezzogiorno, or should they 
be left to the Member States?’ (Begg 2008: 8). Finally, 2013 will mark the year when the 
Member States which acceded in 2004 and 2007 will be entitled to full support from the 
Common Agricultural Policy (the European Council having decided on this delay back in 
2002). In short, by 2011 solidarity with the European southern periphery, as traditionally 
defined and implemented, was becoming a thing of the past. 
‘Discipline’ (or Restricted Sovereignty) and Southern Europe: Rise and Fall 
If ‘solidarity’ was part of a trade off the other side involved accepting new economic rules 
related to sound money and financial discipline. These were first represented in the five 
Maastricht Criteria which had to be met for any nation-state to participate in the single 
currency. The benefits involved in such a trade off were: removal of exchange rate 
uncertainty; greater transparency in relative prices across national borders; reduction of 
transaction costs; lower inflation; and falling risk premia in interest rates, leading to long-
term gains in trade and growth and a consolidation of public finances. The challenges 
involved accepting restrictions on one’s economic sovereignty, specifically in the form of 
acceptance of an economic regime which ruled out nation-states recovering loss of 
competitiveness through devaluing the exchange rate, and made sound public finances 
essential. The trade off was hardly questioned in southern Europe, especially as it was 
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recognised that a model of the economy based on competitive devaluations (which fuelled 
inflation and further devaluations) and large public sector deficits was unsustainable in the 
long-term (Bardone and Reitano 2009: 37-8). Yet, while the first would be imposed by the 
single currency itself (i.e. a sovereign currency was removed), the second required action by 
the nation-states both before (and as a condition of) entry to the single currency and after as 
an economic model based on sound finance.  
In view of the likely benefits, as well as the negative implications of being left out of 
the ‘core’ single currency group, the southern European states were more than willing to 
accept the external constraint in the 1990s and to use it domestically (even by technocrats 
against hesitant politicians) to drive through the measures necessary to bring about fiscal 
adjustment (Dyson and Featherstone, 1996). Consequently, and against expectations, all four 
of the south European states met the Maastricht criteria and entered the single currency (Italy, 
Spain and Portugal in 1999 and Greece in 2001). Yet, the nature of this achievement did not 
in and of itself guarantee that these countries’ fiscal adjustment would continue into the post-
entry phase, for three reasons. 
First, rigid as the Maastricht criteria were, they ‘gave more emphasis to fiscal 
consolidation rather than fiscal sustainability’ (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos 2008: 233) and 
such consolidation could be achieved through methods (especially raising tax revenue) which 
avoided the more difficult to achieve structural reforms essential to the foundation for 
sustainability in the future. Moreover, the one criterion which might have provided a better 
foundation for future progress (reducing the public sector debt to 60% of GDP) was, in the 
run-up to the deadline relaxed to ‘a steady decrease of the public debt rate’ (ibid., 250). 
Second, since there was no supra-national prescription for the means by which fiscal 
consolidation should be achieved it was left to the choice of the individual nation-states to 
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develop their own approaches. While existing evidence suggested that ‘budget consolidations 
relying too heavily on the revenue side by raising taxes rather than on the expenditure side by 
cutting spending are likely to be successful and sustainable’ (ibid., 234), only in the case of 
Spain was a programme of fiscal consolidation based on a reduction in government 
expenditure and extensive structural reform (pensions reforms, labour market reforms, 
welfare reforms, privatisations) (ibid., 241-42; Royo 2009). In contrast, Portugal, Greece and 
Italy successfully achieved fiscal consolidation primarily through increasing tax revenue (and 
at least in one case through some creative accounting2) with little or no reduction in 
government primary expenditure and limited structural reforms – those which were begun (in 
Italy and Greece) remained partial and incomplete (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos 2008: 236-41; 
Torres, 2009; Pagoulatos and Triantopoulos 2009; Bardone and Reitano 2009).  
Third, once participation in the single currency was secured and once the currency 
was launched, the rules of the game changed somewhat. The (spirit of the) pre-entry 
implications about sustainability were meant to be enforced through the Stabilty and Growth 
Pact (SGP)’s Excessive Deficit Procedure for those countries in breach of the 3% rule, and, in 
2002, Portugal fell foul of this and had to enact urgent measures. However, shortly after, with 
the French and German economies similarly struggling but arguing for more flexibility in the 
policy, the rules effectively became ‘softer’ and the credibility of the SGP was undermined, 
thus reducing the pressure on the southern European states to continue with fiscal 
consolidation.  
As a consequence, fiscal consolidation was relaxed in Italy, Greece and Portugal, and 
structural reforms, where they had been commenced, were given less priority (where not 
abandoned). This situation was reflected in both the primary balances (in the cases of Greece 
and Portugal dropping into deficit for some years) and general governmental balances (with 
all three either breaching or coming very close to breaching the Stability Pact’s threshold of 
 9 
 
3% of GDP), situations usually met through one-off corrective measures. In contrast, Spain 
managed to run consistently healthy surplus primary balances and to keep within the Stability 
Pact’s threshold, actually producing surpluses in two years (Blavoukos and Pagoulatos, 2008: 
242-44). Public debt as a percentage of GDP remained largely unchanged in Greece, Portugal 
and Italy, while it was brought down in Spain. 
At the same time, there were two common effects of operating within a single 
currency. First, due largely to high rates of inflation and the strengthening of the Euro, there 
was a decline in their competitiveness (which could not be offset through devaluing the 
currency), reflected in a worsening state of their current accounts. The average figures for the 
decade 1999-2008 (in per cent of GDP) were, for Spain, -5.90 (against -1.73 for the previous 
decade), for Greece -8.75 (against -3.28), for Italy -1.26 (against 0.49) and for Portugal -9.13 
(against -2.01), with the average for the Euro area 0.31 (against 0.26 for the previous decade) 
(Le Cacheux 2010: 51). In theory, this should have led to a reduction in wage rates and the 
development of a more flexible labour market in order to maintain the GDP growth rate and 
employment levels. However, second, the single nominal interest rate set by the European 
Central Bank (ECB) for all Euro area countries brought down real interest rates (i.e. 
accounting for inflation), helping to boost economic growth by making investment and debt 
less costly (and providing an alternative to the enforcement of wage restraint). The average 
real long-term interest rates for 1999-2008 were 1.16 in Spain (against 5.03 for the previous 
decade 1989-98), 0.66 in Greece (against 5.58), 2.22 in Italy (against 6.18) and 1.55 in 
Portugal (against 6.76), and were 2.2 for the Eurozone as a whole (Le Cacheux 2010: 51). 
This meant that, despite the loss of competitiveness, growth was able to be maintained 
through easier credit (reinforced by liberalisation of banking regulations under the single 
market programme) and more manageable deficits. Nevertheless, Italy and Portugal were 
sluggish compared with Greece and Spain, where average growth rates for the decade 1999-
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2008 were 3.54% in Spain and 4.15% in Greece (in contrast with 1.70% in Portugal and 
1.36% in Italy, and an average growth rate of 2.12% for the Euro area overall) (Le Cacheux, 
2010: 50).3 However, gross national income showed convergence with the Euro area average 
in these years for Spain, Greece and Italy, and unemployment fell and was kept at the Euro 
area average, except for Spain (which nonetheless had come from a high figure of 20% in the 
mid-1990s) 
In short, this combination (non-structural approach to fiscal consolidation, relaxing of 
the rules and easy credit) laid the basis for increased (or over) borrowing by governments, 
banks and households and thus a rise in demand and potential overheating of the economies. 
In Blavoukos and Pagoulatos’ words (2008: 242), ‘Once membership was achieved, the … 
[four south European states] … could potentially free ride on the common currency’s 
credibility without being individually penalized by financial markets.’ Low interest rates 
contributed to a boom based on private consumption (and in countries undergoing rapid 
growth such as Spain, a housing bubble), masking at the same time other economic 
weaknesses (low productivity, growth based in areas not exposed to international 
competition, decline in competitiveness, high labour costs, family indebtedness, unresolved 
structural issues). The Euro, moreover helped to sustain severe demand imbalances through 
German banks lending to the southern European states and creating demand for its own 
exports. This exporting of credit dependence increased the divergence between German 
surpluses and south European deficits (Featherstone 2011: 200). As Tombazos (2011: 34) 
argues, ‘….the euro, in the short term encouraged the expansion of some “peripheral” 
economies, where the markets failed sufficiently to enforce “obligatory reforms” in the 
labour market and in the public sector…The financial markets, instead of imposing 
“discipline”, displayed a greater propensity for immediate and uncertain profits’. The four 
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South European states were therefore ill-prepared to cope with the world economic downturn 
in 2008 and the sovereign debt crisis which began in 2010.  
Crisis and Southern Europe: New Forms of Solidarity and Restrictions on Sovereignty? 
The sovereign debt crisis of southern Europe was dramatic, at the heart of which was a 
collapse in market confidence in their capacities to repay their public debts, with Greece, 
Portugal (and Ireland) requiring bail outs, and the Greek bail out failing and requiring, 
therefore, a second. The management of the crisis by EU and Eurozone leaders was 
characterised by a mixture of weakness, division and procrastination, thus exacerbating the 
financial plight of the Eurozone (Underhill 2011). The first Greek bail-out, when it came, 
failed largely because it loaned Greece €110bn at market rates as a means of tiding the 
country over until it could borrow on the markets again. The delay on negotiating the second-
bail out, the evident divisions in the German political position combined with the effects of 
successive downgrades of the crediting ratings of the four southern European countries by the 
international ratings agencies (Standard & Poors, Moody’s, Fitch) were a recipe for a further 
collapse of confidence, as well as for contagion. Spain and notably Italy were dragged into 
difficulties, Italy’s situation changing the whole nature of the debate. The run on the Italian 
markets began in August 2011 and was characterised by dramatic increases in the ‘bond 
spread’ (the difference between the German and Italian ten year bond yields) which touched 
historical highs in November (in November the Italian bond yield surpassed 7%, the 
threshold at which bail outs for Greece and Portugal had been necessitated) and suggested 
that the markets had serious doubts about Italy’s capacity to repay its public debt.  
European and international elites responded to the crisis in two ways, both of which 
were attempts in vain to reassure the markets. The first was to try to prevent contagion by 
transforming the bail-out fund into a much more ambitious financial instrument (European 
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Financial Stability Facility - EFSF) which would have the power to buy bonds of struggling 
debtor countries, to take pre-emptive action before a debt crisis developed too far and to 
provide loans to Eurozone countries to support their banks. Yet, once the crisis reached an 
economy the size of Italy’s (where its public debt amounted to approximately a third of all 
Eurozone debt) it was clear that no EFSF ‘firewall ’would be big enough for that. Worse, by 
late November contagion was beginning to affect both France and Germany, the core 
countries of the Eurozone, France being warned by the credit-rating agency Fitch that it could 
lose its triple A credit rating if the debt crisis deepened, and Germany, on 23 November, 
finding investors shunning its bonds, as it was forced to retain nearly €2.4 billion of a planned 
€6 billion sale (and subsequently faced with yields on its ten year bonds higher than those of 
the UK).  
The second response was to drive through a spate of emergency austerity budgets at 
the national levels, these involving a mixture of tax increases and draconian cuts to the public 
sector. These emergency budgets were not only demanded of the ‘errant’ states by the EU, 
ECB and International Monetary Fund (IMF), but were also closely overseen. In situations 
where national governments appeared incapable of carrying them through (Greece, Italy), the 
lack of political confidence at the European and international levels in them was made 
sufficiently apparent as to exacerbate the country’s market position, the governments fell and 
were replaced by technocrats. Although there were few alternatives, critics were quick to 
condemn the EU for ‘rushing to plunge the euro area peripheral economies into 
recession…’(Tombazos 2011: 34), which, of course, would exacerbate and not alleviate their 
public debt problems.  
It is clear that the depth and protracted nature of the crisis was not just caused by the 
‘errant’ behaviour of the southern European states (as well as Ireland) and EU 
‘mismanagement’ of the crisis. It was also an inevitable consequence of structural flaws in 
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the Eurozone edifice, and especially those related to the nature and management of sovereign 
debt. Adair Turner (2011), adopting Charles Goodhart’s distinction between ‘fully sovereign 
debt’ (where fully sovereign bonds are issued by a sovereign authority which is also a 
currency issuing authority), and ‘subsidiary sovereign debt’ (where the bonds are issued by 
political units which are not themselves currency issuing authorities) argues that the 
Eurozone nations were, with the single currency, transformed from fully to subsidiary 
sovereign bond issuers. However, the institutional precautions necessary to offset the greater 
risks this change embodied were not acted upon. Fully sovereign debt can, at the extreme, be 
monetised. This carries with it risks (inflation, currency depreciation) which are of a more 
manageable nature than default. Subsidiary sovereign debt, on the other hand, carries with it a 
nominal and real repayment risk, and where, as in Southern Europe, situations arise where the 
nominal debt cannot be re-paid, it cannot (under the existing arrangements) be monetised. 
The European governance framework separates responsibility for monetary stabilisation 
(European level) from fiscal, invariably distributive policies (at Member State level). While 
this placed it in a position to manage the 2008-09 crisis (which was about financial liquidity) 
it could not deal with the 2010-11 sovereign debt crisis where Member State autonomy had 
prevailed (Shelkle 2011: 381-2).4 The Eurozone model, therefore, was highly ambivalent 
about ‘bail outs’ of errant states, excluding them on the one hand but failing to provide any 
effective instruments for dealing with those states on the other: ‘the logic was of stability 
increasing the credibility of the arrangements’ (Featherstone 2011: 202). Finally, to 
exacerbate matters, the banks were incentivised by regulation to become major investors in 
sovereign bonds, making it easier to continue issuing those bonds until unsustainable levels 
were met and thus increasing the risk to the banking system as a whole. 
 Yet, if these problems suggested obvious solutions, they were far from easy to 
introduce, largely for political reasons. The idea of Eurobonds and the European Central 
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Bank acting as the lender of last resort, proposed formally by the President of the European 
Commission, José Barroso, was flatly rejected by Germany both for fear of inflation 
(embedded in the German psyche from the 1920s) and ‘moral hazard’ (that southern 
European nations would fear indebtedness even less in the knowledge that their debts would 
in the end be bought out by somebody else). The crisis therefore raised a fundamental issue 
of EU governance which the richer nations (and specifically, Germany) had been avoiding 
until then: whether EMU should be a ‘debt union’ based on solidarity and burden-sharing, in 
which the richer nations would guarantee the borrowings of the poorer nations. It had proved 
elusive in the original model, Dyson describing ‘the prospect of people being asked to make 
sacrifices for others with whom there was a weak sense of identity’ as the Achille’s Heel of 
the EU (cited in Featherstone 2011: 211). The dilemma, therefore, was to find an appropriate 
set of arrangements which would satisfy different member-states and the electorates their 
governments represented. Such arrangements could only be based on closer ties between the 
Eurozone economies entailing new forms of solidarity in exchange for restrictions on national 
economic sovereignty e.g. binding limits on borrowing. The profligacy of the southern 
European states, in short, had exposed the cracks in the Eurozone edifice and was forcing a 
significant reform of European economic governance as a consequence.  
Yet, such moves would not only have to overcome the deep reservations of the 
peoples of the richer nations towards burden-sharing in relation to southern Europe, it would 
also have to address reservations from the periphery, for whom it was not clear how 
acceptable European ‘tutelage’ (depending on the form it took) would be in the long-term. 
For Tombazos (2011: 41), ‘Today the feeling in Greece is that the country is now under 
occupation. The IMF, the European Commission and the ECB not only dictate policy, but 
also oversee its implementation. More generally, the attempt to tighten the supervision of 
nation states by European bodies is perceived in Southern Europe as an attempt of the 
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European core to place the European periphery under check.’ The Italian government, for 
example, overseeing one of the largest economies in the world, was, in the latter part of 2011, 
essentially placed under a form of EU ‘tutelage’, being ordered to bring forward by a year its 
goal of balancing the budget and being informed what measures had to be incorporated in 
order to do so. And Berlusconi’s supporters did not hide their feelings that the centre right 
government had effectively been forced out of office through a collapse in confidence not just 
of the markets but of Chancellor Merkel, President Sarkozy and other European elites. 
This raises the critical issue of whether we may be witnessing the beginning of an 
unexpected ‘falling out’ between the peoples of southern Europe and the European Union, 
and this during a time when Europe generally is undergoing a shift in support for the EU 
from a ‘permissive consensus’ to a ‘constraining dissensus’ (Hooghe and Marks 2009). The 
peoples of Southern Europe have (albeit with periodic exceptions, notably in relation to 
Greece) been fairly reliable and consistent supporters of the integration process. The most 
recent detailed analyses of Eurosceptism in southern Europe largely pre-dated the economic 
crisis (Verney 2011a), and concluded that, in the period until then (2008-09), southern 
Europe did make up the mainstream drift towards a ‘constraining dissensus’. Nevertheless, 
the analyses also revealed evidence of more nuanced forms of Euroscepticism in the past, a 
rise in Eurosceptism in the 2000s and relatively high percentages of those in some countries 
currently indifferent to, or ignorant, about the EU. These findings suggested that there is the 
potential for negative views about the EU to grow (Verney 2011b). The last Eurobarometer 
survey on popular attitudes to the Euro (2010) revealed that, apart from France, only the four 
southern European states fell below the Eurozone average of those who thought that having 
the Euro was a good thing for Europe, even if the percentages were still high (from 61% in 
Portugal to 65% in Italy against an average of 65% for the Eurozone as a whole) 
(Eurobarometer 2010: 10). True, the violent protests that have been witnessed in countries 
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such as Greece and Italy have, until now, been directed primarily against the failings of their 
national governments. Yet, the severe austerity is effectively being imposed on these 
countries from above and it is not inconceivable for the protests to be directed against the EU 
in the future, the more the supra-national level concerns itself not just with monitoring 
national governments’ finances but regulating, if not dictating, their budgets. By the end of 
2011, therefore, the southern European states faced a watershed: having lost the trust of their 
Eurozone counterparts they could no longer expect to receive European solidarity without 
increased externally-imposed discipline and restrictions on their economic sovereignty. 
 
Conclusion 
The ‘golden era’ that characterised the Mediterranean enlargement and the Mediterranean-EU 
relationship of the 1980s and 1990s has disappeared. The ‘trade-off’ between ‘solidarity’ and 
‘discipline’ appeared to function well until the launch of the single currency, under the guise 
of the EU as an ‘external constraint’. However, the particular mode of economic governance 
that developed under the single currency was (even if unwittingly) predicated on the idea that 
the ‘external constraint’ had, somehow, been ‘internalised’. The flexibility this allowed, 
combined with the new challenges of operating in a single currency led the southern 
European states into a situation where they were poorly prepared for the world economic 
downturn that began in 2008. The result is a crisis in the EU-southern European relationship 
whose resolution has pulled the EU towards two opposing extremes: either towards some 
southern European states defaulting and exiting the Euro; or towards a debt union and full 
supranational economic governance. Whether a middle of the road route is possible (‘a fudge, 
well short of fiscal union’ – Manchau 2011) is possible remains open to question, but all 
 17 
 
three scenarios signal a dramatic change in the EU-southern European relationship, and the 
definitive end of the golden era. 
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Notes 
The author is grateful to Leonardo Morlino for his suggestions and advice. 
 
1 And in stark contrast with other EU ‘regional’ groupings, albeit partly (but not only) because of the 
fragmentation within these groupings between Euro and non-Euro countries (see Dimitrov 2012 and Sitter 
2012).  
2 An audit conducted in 2004 by a former Finance Minister, George Alogoskoufis, concluded that Greece had 




3 The Portuguese economy, in fact, experienced a small boom before entering the single currency, based also on 
increasing indebtedness (Torres 2010: 56-9). 
4 This heightened risk explains why, even though the aggregate Eurozone percentage of debt to GDP was, in 
2011, lower than for the UK, US or Japan, the average interest rate paid on its debt was much higher. 
